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Abstract 
The Japanese government has implemented various positive aid sanctions policies in 
African countries. There are two main reasons why the Japanese government preferred 
to use the positive sanctions. Firstly, the Japanese government refrained from taking 
strict measures against countries that maintain strong economic and diplomatic 
relations with Japan. Second, even if the Japanese government did take punitive 
measure against those countries it softened its stance as soon as a convenient pretext 
could be found. All this indicates that policymakers in Japanese government still give 
priority to Japan’s economic interests.  
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1. Introduction 
To understand Japan’s positive aid sanctions policy, the Japanese way of imposing aid 
sanctions needs to be taken into account. The Japanese government justifies its dealings 
with repressive regimes by stressing the importance of the “persuasive approach” 
practiced or “positive aid sanction” by Japanese government. According to Nikitina and 
Furuoka (2007), the Japanese government maintained that the policy dialogue pursued 
by Japan was “unique” in that Japan does not apply its standards automatically to the 
planning of development projects”.  
 
Furthermore, Japan’s ODA 1995 states that when problems contravening the principles 
of the ODA Charter occur, it is important to listen to explanations of recipient countries 
and hold dialogues with them. The document thus describes Tokyo’s methods, “The 
Japanese approach is to work tenaciously on the recipient countries toward achieving 
the goal through friendly persuasion and quiet and patient diplomacy” (MOFA, 1995a: 
47). 
 
As can be seen from the above statements, the Japanese government uses its aid power 
to influence aid recipients not only by employing “negative aid sanctions” but also 
through the use of the “positive aid sanctions”. In other words, Japan can choose to 
impose negative aid sanction positive aid sanction (an increase in foreign aid) would be 
applied to aid recipients that conduct desirable polices in the light of Japan’s ODA 
Charter (Furuoka, 2007). 
 
The Japanese government admits that it prefers to use positive aid sanction. According 
to Japan’s ODA 1995, Tokyo adopts positive aid sanctions with the aim of encouraging 
recipient countries that show signs of improvement in such areas as democratisation, 
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human rights and restraints in military expenditure. By contrast, Japan employs negative 
sanctions when political situations in recipient countries are viewed as undesirable in 
the light of Japan’s ODA Charter (MOFA, 1995a: 48). 
 
According to Nikitina and Furuoka, the Japanese government tends to think that 
positive aid sanctions are more practical and effective than negative sanctions. The 
Japanese government explains its preference for the use of positive aid sanctions by 
stating that negative sanctions can backfire and thus retard the movement toward 
improvement. Besides, the use of negative sanctions may create an impression that 
Japan is trying to impose her values on aid recipients (Nikitina and Furuoka, 2007, p.5). 
 
However, an important question is whether Japan’s preference for positive sanction is 
effective or desirable. There are contradicting views on the practice of dealing with 
repressive regimes through positive aid sanctions. For example, a leading Japanese 
economic journal praised Japan’s initiative in Myanmar, calling it “Sun diplomacy”. 
Using an analogy of Aesop’s fable about a wager between the north wind and the sun, 
the article compared the US approach (negative aid sanctions) to the north wind while 
Japan’s policy (positive aid sanctions) was equated with the sun. According to the 
journal, Tokyo’s diplomatic efforts and contacts with the Myanmar military government 
contributed to the release of Aung San Su Kyi (Nikitina and Furuoka, 2007, p.7).  
 
2. Positive Aid Sanctions 
Although the Japanese government has more frequently employed positive aid sanctions 
since the ODA Charter’s introduction in 1992, a prototype of this method had existed 
before the announcement of the new aid guidelines. According to Inada (1995: 5), 
Japan’s active assistance to the new government of the Philippines, after President 
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Marcos was ousted in 1986, can be considered the first case of the application of 
positive sanction. 
 
Since the introduction of the new aid guidelines, Tokyo applied positive aid sanctions 
provided foreign aid to three Latin American countries, Nicaragua (1991), El Salvador 
(1991) and Peru (1992). These nations had a long history of civil disorder and had 
struggled to establish more democratic political systems. Positive sanctions was also 
employed in Africa in Madagascar (1991), Zambia (1992) and Guinea (1992).  
 
4. Case Study: Japan’s Positive Aid Sanctions in Africa 
There were three cases of positive said sanctions in Africa, i.e. in Madagascar (1991), 
Zambia (1992) and Guinea (1992).  First of ally, in 1989, in Madagascar, the military 
socialist government led by Didir Ratsiraka won the general election. However, soon 
after the election, people became disillusioned and started to criticise the socialist 
regime. As an anti-government movement gained strength, the political situation in 
Madagascar became shaky. In 1991, the socialist government ceased to rule the country. 
A referendum for a new constitution was held in August 1991. In November 1991, a 
plan to hold presidential and parliamentary elections was announced. With the help of 
the French government, the new constitution was implemented and elections were held. 
In the presidential election in February 1992, Albert Zafy defeated Ratsiraka and 
became Madagascar’s new president.1  
 
To support political changes in Madagascar, the Japanese government donated ¥5.46 
million (US$43 thousand) to purchase portable radios for the election. As Japan’s ODA 
1993 noted, “The two-way portable radios donated to the City of Tananarive… proved 
                                                 
1 In 1997, Zafy was defeated by Ratsiraka in the presidential election. 
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to be quite helpful in the presidential and parliamentary elections held in that country 
(Madagascar)” (MOFA, 1993a: 37). In one year, Japan’s ODA to Madagascar increased 
more than three-fold from US$13 million in 1990 to US$40 million in 1991 (MOFA, 
1995a: 402-423). 
  
Secondly, in Zambia, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was in power for 
more than 25 years, since that country’s independence. Gradually, a one party system 
was established in the country, and fair elections had not been held. In October 1991, 
prompted by moves towards democracy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
general and presidential elections took place in Zambia. The Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD) won a landslide victory and a critic of President Kenneth Kaunda 
and co-founder of the MMD, Frederick Chiluba, was inaugurated as the new president 
of Zambia. This was the first time since Zambia’s independence 27 years before that the 
power in the country was transferred peacefully (MOFA, 1993b: 146). 
 
In response to positive changes in Zambia, “Japan is assisting the new administration, 
which is facing economic difficulties, in its efforts to move toward democracy and a 
market-oriented economy. In March 1992, it provided ¥3.5 billion (US$26.9 million) in 
non-project grant aid” (MOFA, 1992a: 28). 
 
Japan’s ODA to Zambia doubled from US$40 million in 1990 to US$82 million in 
1991. By 1993, it increased by 45 percent and reached US$116 million, making Japan 
Zambia’s second biggest aid donor. In 1992, Zambia received from the Japanese 
government a bilateral loan amounting to ¥9.74 billion (US$74.9 million) to support 
privatisation and industrial reform projects. In the same year, Japan gave a grant 
amounting to ¥912 million (US$7.01 million) for the Kafue bridge reconstruction 
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project (MOFA, 1995a: 429-431). 
 
Finally, in 1990, Guinea’s military government pledged to introduce political reforms. 
The government promised to enact the country’s constitution and give rights to the 
people. The new constitution established a two-party system and universal adult 
suffrage (MOFA, 1993c: 38-39). Guinea’s government also pledged to hold a general 
election and to peacefully transfer power to a civilian government.2
  
Japan showed support for positive changes in Guinea by providing funds to assist the 
country’s general election. The Japanese government gave non-project grant assistance 
to purchase equipment necessary for running the election in 1992. However, according 
to Japan’s ODA 1993, “As Guinea had postponed the election itself,3 the counterpart 
funds (Japanese funds) have not been used yet” (MOFA, 1993a: 37). 
 
Japan’s bilateral grants to Guinea increased almost three-fold from US$7.7 million in 
1990 to US$21 million in 1991, and amounted to US$24 million in 1992. In 1991, with 
ODA amounting to US$98 million, Japan was the second biggest aid donor to Guinea 
after France (MOFA, 1995a: 395-397). 
 
Furthermore, besides giving bilateral assistance to African countries, the Japanese 
government organized the Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD) in October 1993. The conference adopted the “Tokyo Declaration on African 
Development” that urged African countries to learn from Asia’s experience. The 
provision of foreign aid to TICAD can be considered as a part of Japan’s positive aid 
                                                 
2 President Lansana Conte won elections both in 1993 and 1998. 
3 The presidential election was held in 1993. The legislative election after having been postponed several 
times was finally held in 1995.  
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sanctions in Africa. The declaration of the conference announced, “We acknowledge 
some relevance of the Asian experience for African development. The very diversity of 
successful Asian countries gives hope that lessons can be drawn for African 
development” (MOFA, 2007).  
 
The Economist reported that at the Tokyo conference the debate concerning the lessons 
from the East Asian development model was intense. “Perhaps the brand of capitalism 
urged upon Africa by western donors was faulty, ran the implication: Africa should 
follow the Asian way”. The conference became a platform to deliver the voice of 
dissent against Western methods of development. According to The Economist, while 
Western aid is increasingly conditional upon clean and open government, some of the 
African leaders felt unhappy about this interference. As the journal put it, “Uganda’s 
President Yowen Museveni told the Tokyo conference that donors should not interfere 
in Africa’s general development. Foreigners had interfered with Africa for the past 500 
years, he said, and its present crisis had been caused mainly by outsiders” (The 
Economist, October, 1993: 35). 
 
Japan contributed to development in Africa not only by giving foreign aid. The Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development (TICAD) was an attempt by the 
Japanese government to show an alternative development model to African countries. 
Some Japanese policymakers are sceptical about Western attempts to induce 
development and democracy in Africa.  For example, a top Japanese diplomat, Director 
of the African Division (II) of the MOFA, Kiyokazu Ota, argues that Japan should 
recognise an “African way of democracy” and refrain from applying Western standards 
to African countries (Gaiko Foramu, August/September, 1998: 26). 
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Some Japanese scholars share this point of view. A researcher from a government think-
tank maintains that African countries should embrace the “African way of democracy”. 
He argues that if, as in some Asian nations, African countries adopt authoritarian 
political systems to develop their economies and such systems contribute to the 
advancement of the nation’s welfare, the authoritarianism can be justified (Gaiko 
Foramu, August/September, 1998: 26). 
 
According to Stein (1998: 45), the Japanese government, especially the MOFA, is 
particularly critical about the feasibility of the “Structural Adjustment Policy” 
advocated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). He claims that 
after a high-ranking African official criticised the social dimension of the adjustment 
policy, the MOFA asked UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development) to reassess applying the lessons from Asian development to Africa. 
  
3. Evaluation of Japanese Positive Aid Sanctions in Africa 
Japan applied positive aid sanctions and provided additional foreign aid to assist the 
political and economic reforms in Madagascar, Zambia and Guinea. However, it would 
be an oversimplification to say that these positive aid sanctions methods have 
effectively contributed to the improvement of the political situations in these countries. 
The political situation in Zambia deteriorated after the election in 1991. In Guinea, the 
military junta continued to control the country.  
 
Only in Madagascar, have there been some positive developments after the election in 
1992 when the newly elected government discarded the socialist ideology and pledged 
to establish a system based on human rights and democracy (MOFA, 1993b, 151-152).  
 
 
 
8
However, the major factor behind Madagascar’s transformation to a more democratic 
system was the efforts of the French government that stressed the political conditions in 
the former French colonies (Aoki, 1998: 6).  
 
Table 1 
Positive Aid Sanctions (1986-2002) 
 
Country Year Measures Human 
Rights 
Condition 
Index 
Area 
1. Madagascar 1991 To assist the general 
elections 
Four (1991) 
 
Africa 
2. Zambia 1992 To assist privatisation and 
industrial reform 
Two (1992) 
 
Africa 
3. Guinea 1992 To assist the general 
election 
Six (1992) 
 
Africa 
Source: Nikitina and Furuoka (2007), p.11 
 
On the other hand, at least three questions arise concerning the relevance of the TICAD. 
First, Asian countries had been developing in a specific international environment that 
T.J. Pempel called the “Developmental Regime”. Western countries supported East 
Asian countries by providing them with vast amounts of foreign aid and importing their 
production. However, a unique “Asian Development Model” cannot be easily 
transferred to other regions. As Pempel (2000: 82) put it, “It is highly unlikely that 
potential emulator will have anything like the favourable international conditions that 
were enjoyed by these countries (East Asian countries)”.   
 
Second, after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the region faced a serious economic 
setback. Despite the fact that during the Tokyo conference in 1993, delegates were 
sufficiently impressed by the successful economic performance of East Asian nations, 
African leaders might not any longer be interested in learning from Asia. The 
 
 
9
fundamental question remains: are the lessons from Asia really relevant for African 
countries? 
 
Another point to consider is that Asian countries stressed economic development as the 
ultimate target for a nation. East Asian countries with strong propensities for promotion 
of economic development could be defined as “developmental states”. According to 
Peter Evans (1995), the developmental states tend to act as coherent entities to deliver 
the collective good. Such developmental states tend to be immersed in dense networks 
of groups and classes that can become allies in the pursuit of the societal goal, which is 
“economic development”.    
 
In “developmental states”, authoritarian regimes are justified for the sake of 
development. Chalmers Johnson (2000: 53) gave the following answer to the question 
as to whether the developmental state is democratic, “If one means by democracy some 
form of state accountability to the representatives of the majority of citizens combined 
with respect for the rights of minorities, the answer is probably no”. In other words, 
there is a danger that African countries might be tempted to justify authoritarian rule by 
adopting the “Developmental State Model” argument. 
 
12. Conclusion 
 The Japanese government prefers to use the method of positive aid sanction rather than 
negative aid sanctions, claiming the former to be more effective in reaching policy 
goals. Policymakers in Tokyo maintain that negative aid sanctions can backfire and 
retard democratic movements in aid recipients. Putting aside official explanations, the 
facts show that Japan avoids taking stern actions when human rights abuses occur in 
Asia. Special treatment of Japan’s important economic partners in Asia may be the real 
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reason for Tokyo’s preference for the use of positive aid sanction. The Japanese 
government did not take punitive measures against several countries when grave human 
rights violations happened, because suspending aid could seriously hurt Japan’s 
economic interests.  
  
When the new aid guidelines were adopted in 1991, the Japanese government promised 
to rigorously apply those to promote “universal values”. In practice, the principles were 
often sacrificed for the sake of economic interests. Japan seems to pledge to promote 
human rights and democracy with the aim of showing solidarity with other aid donor 
countries while the pursuit of economic interests remains the main driving force behind 
Japanese aid sanctions policy.  
 
Overall, two trends can be observed in Japan’s positive aid sanctions policy. First, the 
Japanese government refrained from taking strict measures against countries that 
maintain strong economic and diplomatic relations with Japan. Second, even if Tokyo 
did take punitive measure against those countries it softened its stance as soon as a 
convenient pretext could be found. All this indicates that policymakers in Tokyo still 
give priority to Japan’s economic interests.  
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